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COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS-MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER'S FRAUD IN THE PURCHASE OF STOCK-Whether or not there has been fraud in the purchase of property, due to either affirmative statements or mere non-disclosure, may well depend upon the relation of the purchaser to the
vendor. The recent case of Speed v. Transamerica Corporation1 presents two questions relative to this problem in the purchase of corporation shares: first, whether the price quoted in an offer to purchase
can ever be the basis of an action for fraud and deceit; and second,
whether the majority shareholder of a corporation occupies a fiduciary
relation to minority shareholders in the purchase of their stock. Defendant was the majority stockholder of the Axton-Fisher Tobacco
Company and had, pursuant to its written offer, purchased stock of
plaintiff, a minority stockholder in such company, at a price quoted
in the offer. From the evidence presented in a deceit action brought
by plaintiff, the court found that the defendant had devised a scheme
whereby it intended to acquire the holdings of the minority shareholders at a price much less than the real value thereof and thereafter
to capture for itself the appreciated value of the leaf tobacco inventory
of Axton-Fisher by liquidation. The court felt that in making the
offer the defendant had impliedly represented the price quoted to be
fair, when in the presence of an existing intent to liquidate, the true
value of the shares was far greater. The offer, therefore, viewed as
a representation as to value, was false and as such was held to be a
1 (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808. Various phases of the litigation have already
been reported in Speed v. Transamerica Corporation, (D.C. Del. 1945) 5 F.R.D. 56;
(D.C. Del. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 457.
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misrepresentation upon which a common law action for fraud and
deceit could be based. The court did not appear to ground its decision on
a finding of the existence of any fiduciary relationship nor, as a corollary,
a finding of the existence of a duty to make affirmative disclosures. It
is not the purpose of this comment to explore all the possible ramifications of either the reasoning of the court or the correctness of the ultimate finding of defendant's liability to respond in damages.2 Moreover, it will be assumed that the evidence supported the inference that
at the time the offer was made there did exist an intent to liquidate.
Instead, this comment will concern itself with but two questions:
namely, whether the price quoted in the offer to purchase was an
actionable misrepresentation, and whether, as a possible alternative
ground for recovery, the relation of the parties was such as would
convert non-disclosure of the intent to liquidate into actionable fraudulent concealment.
I. Offer of Price as Representation of Value

In holding that the offer to purchase at the quoted price constituted a representation as to value, the District Court of Delaware, in
language at least, did not seem to attach much importance to the relation of the parties.3 Instead, the question was treated as one involving the usual vendor-purchaser case of deceit framed in terms of actionable misrepresentation. The court did not find that the defendant, because of its position as majority shareholder, was under a duty
to speak and make disclosure of the contemplated liquidation; rather, it
found that the defendant had spoken and that the statement as to price
made in the offer to purchase were, when viewed with the accompanying circumstances, affirmative misrepresentations as to the value of the
2 In addition to the fraud and deceit count of plaintiff's complaint, there were three
other counts charging violation of §10 (b), as amended, of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78j (b), and Rule X-l0B-5 promulgated thereunder. It should
be noted that the principal reason for the court's decision was based on these three counts,
with the question of common law deceit being but a minor issue.
3 There were various factors present, other than the discrepancy in the quoted price,
which undoubtedly inHuenced the court as it spoke of the so-called ''badges of fraud."
Among these were the inclusion in the offer of the condition that the offer was to be
contingent upon acceptance by a certain number of shareholders and upon acceptance before
a certain date; the failure of defendant to disclose the recent increased earnings and the
increased value of the tobacco inventory; and also, refusal of defendant to answer inquiries
concerning the offer. These factors were not considered as constituting possible actionable
misrepresentations, but instead were treated as important only insofar as they aided in
answering the primary inquiry as to whether there was any pre-existing intent to capture
the inventory profit.
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shares. In so doing, the court did not purport to limit this reasoning
to sales involving majority and minority stockholders, but seemingly
the reasoning applied to every vendor-purchaser case regardless of
parties and regardless of subject matter. The possible implications of
the court's reasoning and language are far-reaching and certainly open
to question as transgressing the limits of established law. Absent
some sort of fiduciary relation or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between the parties, statements as to value made by the
purchaser during negotiations cannot generally be made the basis of
a charge of fraud. 4 Such statements are statements of opinion, and
therefore, even if an offer is construed as a representation as to value,
reliance upon it, absent some particular relation between the parties,
would hardly seem justified. 5 The ordinary contract of sale is not
intrinsically fiduciary; each party is trying to make the best bargain
possible and if the purchaser belittles the worth of the subject matter of the sale, whether it is in his offer or otherwise, this should
be no more a misrepresentation as to value than the vendor's exaggerated statements as to its worth. 6 To say that a purchaser who offers
x dollars for some shares or chattels or realty, represents that the subject matter of the sale is worth x dollars, seems not only unrealistic, but
startling as well.
II. Relationship of Parties as Affecting Duty to Disclose

In cases of fraud and deceit, the relationship of the parties is a factor
which must be considered. Oftentimes the turning point on the question of liability depends on whether the parties are complete strangers
4 Where the subject matter of the sale is stock, see 12 FLETCHBR, CYc. CoRP. §5586
(1932); where the subject matter is land, see 56 A.L.R. 429 (1928), 27 R.C.L., Vendor
and Purchaser §90 (1920) and 5 WILLISTON, CoNI'RACTs §1498 (1937). See also Laidlow
v. Organ, 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.) 178 (1817). The usual example given in cases involving
land is the one where one person knows of valuable mineral deposits on the land of another
who is ignorant of such fact.
5 ''Thus, a false opinion, exercised intentionally by the buyer to the seller, of the value
of the property offered for sale, where there is no special confidence or relation or inB.uence
between the parties, and each meets the other on equal grounds, relying on his own judgment, is not sufficient to avoid a contract of sale." I STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 14th
ed., §279 (1918); also 3 PoMEROY, EQUl'l'Y JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §878a (1941).
Wessel v. Union Savings and Loan Assn., 198 La. 219, 3 S. (2d) 594 (1941) and Markey
v. Hibernia Homestead Assn., (La. App. 1943) 13 S. (2d) 791, wherein the court held
that an offer to purchase plaintiff's stock at so much on the dollar did not indicate that the
offeror considered that amount to be the value of the stock. See also Moore v. Steinman
Hardware Co., 319 Pa. 430, 179 A. 565 (1935).
6 BoWER, THB LAw oF ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION §5la (1927). On the treatment of commendatory trade talk, see 23 AM.. Jun., Fraud and Deceit §33 (1939).
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to each other or whether instead there is some particular relationship
existent between them. Thus, whether reliance upon a statement of
opinion is justi:6.ed or whether there is a duty to speak may depend on
whether there is a :6.duciary relation or special con:6.dence between the
parties. In cases involving the sale of stock, there is certainly a factual
difference between sales involving, two parties, strangers both to each
other and to the corporation, and sales involving two parties one of
whom is an insider, whether he is an officer, director, or controlling
shareholder, either majority or minority, of the company. If there are
affirmative misstatements as to material facts, or if the vendor makes
inquiry and receives false information, there would of course be liability in either case. 7 A$suming, however, the case where the purchaser remains silent, the question of fraud, in terms of fraudulent concealment, depends on the effect of non-disclosure. Mere non-disclosure as such does not amount to fraud unless there is found a duty to
speak followed by a suppression of the truth, and the presence or absence of such a duty may well depend on the relationship of the
parties. 8 Under ordinary circumstances, in the case involving two
strangers, there is no duty on the purchaser to disclose facts, advantageous to the vendor, concerning the thing to be sold which would
enhance its value or cause the vendor to demand a higher price and
the like. 9 There being no duty to speak, failure to disclose would not
amount to fraudulent concealment. On this the law seems clear.
When the purchaser, however, is an insider, the law, although not·
confused, is at least very unsatisfactory.10 Most of the cases which
arise involve the purchase of corporate shares of stock by a director of
the corporation from an individual stockholder, who subsequently sues
the director alleging concealments. On this question, although the
courts are not in agreement, the majority view is that the director has
the same right to buy stock without disclosure from a shareholder as
7 "In determining what constitutes fraud in the sale of stock, the general principles on
the subject of fraud are to be applied." 12 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §§5580, 5581 (1932).
Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 4454 (1916) and Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich.
504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925).
8 3 PoMEROY, EQmTY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §§901, 903 (1941), and 23 AM.. Jan.,
Fraud and Deceit §77 (1939). See also the comment in 15 TEX. L. RBv. 1 (1936) on the
general subject of concealment and non-disclosure.
9 12 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §5589 (1932).
10 3 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., revised volume, §§1168-1171 (1947); BALLANTINB,
CORPORATIONS §80 (1946); and 2 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §1363 (1927).
On the subject see, de Funiak, ''Fraud or Misrepresentation by Purchaser Inducing Sales
of Shares of Stock," 26 KY. L.J. 285 (1938).
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has anyone else.11 There is no fiduciary responsibility imposed which
precludes the officer or director from buying or selling the corporation's
stock merely because he is an officer or director of that corporation.
Diametrically opposed to this view, which certainly shocks the moral
sense of justice, is the view of the minority of courts which hold that a
director cannot purchase stock from a shareholder without giving him
the benefit of any official knowledge he possesses which may increase
the value of the stock.12 In effect, the directors are fiduciaries, much
the same as trustees, for the individual stockholders with respect to their
stock. Between these two extremes is the intermediary "special facts"
doctrine which is applicable in cases involving special circumstances,
where the use of inside information would give the director a great
and unfair advantage in bargaining position.13 Under this view, the
special facts may give rise to a limited fiduciary duty to disclose and a
director will not be allowed to purchase stock from a stockholder with~
out making known any official knowledge which he may possess in
relation to the corporation's affairs or affecting the value of the stock.
From this it can be seen that although a director may be looked upon
as a fiduciary in some respects, the courts are hesitant, with the exception of those that adhere to the minority view, to find such relationship
in cases involving purchase of shares by the director. This is also true
in the case wherein it is the controlling shareholder who has made the
purchase. The courts here, analogizing the case to one involving a
director, more often than not will say that there is no duty to disclose
and consequently no liability for concealment. Thus, although there
most certainly is a factual difference where one of the parties is an
insider, there seems to be little legal difference in the eyes of a majority
of the courts.

III. Conclusions
The law as stated in the above discussion relative to the question of
fraudulent concealment seems far from consonant with principles of
l l See treatises cited in note IO supra. 1 CooK, CoBPORATIONS, 7th ed., §320 (1913);
BoWBR, THE LAw RELATING TO ACTIONABLE NoN-Th:scLOSUIIB 165 (1915); and 84
A.L.R. 615 (1933). The Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44
Ind. 509 (1873); Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 319 Pa. 430, 179 A. 565 (1935);
and Waller v. Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 283 S.W. 1047 (1926).
1 2 See treatises cited in note IO supra. See also Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E.
232 (1903), and the able argument of Judge Ladd in Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co.,
176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 1929 (1916).
13 See treatises cited in note IO supra. For the leading case in support of this view,
see Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521 (1909).
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justice and fair dealing. A legal premium should not be given to the
insiders in active control of the corporation who possess, because of
their official positions, superior knowledge and means of information
and who, because of their strategic position of dominance, control the
destinies of the corporation and its individual shareholders.14 Because
of position and concomitant control of the corporation, the director or
controlling shareholder does stand in a particular relation to the individual stockholders.15 He occupies a peculiar position of trust and confidence, and as such should be considered a :fiduciary bound to exercise the utmost good faith and to refrain from making any misrepresentation, either affirmatively or negatively, which would mislead or
deceive the other party for the purpose of advancing his own interests.
Admittedly, a majority shareholder, by virtue of his stock ownership,
has a right to control the corporation, but when that right is exercised
as a legal power over the community of interests of all the shareholders,
the law should not permit an unconscionable exercise in favor of one
group at the expense of another. 16 Whether or not there is a duty to
speak really presents a question of fair conduct under the circumstances, and surely the principles of justice, equity, and fair dealing
should have made disclosure incumbent on the defendant in the priµcipal case. It is submitted, therefore, that the ultimate finding of liability was undoubtedly correct, but it is believed that the better approach would have been in terms of breach of a fiduciary duty to make
affirmative disclosures rather than in terms of affirmative actionable
misrepresentations.
Thomas P. Segerson, S.Ed.

14 As to the privilege of non-disclosure, see 2 CoNTRACTS RBsTATEMENT §472(1)
(1932).
15 Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, (9th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 335; Lebold "·
Inland S.S. Co., (7th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 351, rehearing den. (7th Cir. 1941) 125
F. (2d) 369, noted in 28 VA. L. RBv. 1132 (1942); Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co.,
(8th Cir. 1906) 144 F. 765; Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, (8th Cir. 1928)
29 F. (2d) 383; Pergament v. Frazer, (D.C. Mich. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 13; Alster "·
British Type Investors, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 949; Hirshhom v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co., (D.C. Pa. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 11; Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., (D.C. Pa.
1941) 42 F. Supp. 586; and Backus v. Finkelstein, (D.C. Minn. 1924) 23 F. (2d) 531.
16 STEVENS, CoRPORATIONs, 2d ed., 126 (1949); 13 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §§5810,
5811 (1943); 1 MoRAWETL, THE LAw oF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §477 (1886); and
Rohrlich, "Suits in Equity by Minority Shareholders as a Means of Corporate Control,"
81 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 692 (1933). Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 39 S.Ct.
533 (1919); Soderstrom v. Kungsholm Baking Co., (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 1008;
Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Committee v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., (D.C. Cir.
1949) 173 F. (2d) 416.

